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NOTES.
THE LAW SCHOOL-THE ORDER OF THE COIF.-On May 16,
1912, four members of the Class of 1912 were authorized by the

National Secretary of The Order of the Coif to formally organize
a chapter of that society in the University of Pennsylvania Law
School.
The Order of the Coif is an honorary legal society. Its purpose as expressed in its constitution is "To foster a spirit of careful
study and to mark in a fitting manner those who have attained a
high grade of scholarship." With this aim in view, only those
members of the graduating class of law schools where it exists, who
attain high scholastic standing, are eligible for election to membership in the respective chapters of The Order of the Coif.
The national organization was originally founded as Theta
Kappa Nu, but as it began to grow, it was thought desirable to adopt
a name which would differentiate it from Greek letter fraternities,
and which would also indicate its legal character; and for that reason
"The Order of the Coif" was selected,-a name famous in English
(657)
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legal history. The English Order of the Coif was composed of the
sergeants-at-law to whom constant reference is made in the law
reports.
The American order has now twelve chapters, as follows:
Northwestern, Chicago, Wisconsin, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska,
Illinois, Iowa, Leland Stanford, Western Re.serve, Virginia, and the
University of Pennsylvania. Its badge is a key, similar in general
shape to the Phi Beta Kappa key, but with the corners clipped,
bearing upon its face a head, showing the wig with the symbolic
coif. The original coif was a hood of white lawn; but after wigs
came into fashion, completely covering the coif, a piece of white
lawn on the top of the wig represented the coif.
The local chapter of the order has not yet been formally organized; but its organization will be perfected very shortly. Graduates
of the Law School who would have been eligible to membership had
the society existed at the date of their graduation, are eligible to election as members of the local chapter, as are also the members of the
Faculty of the Law School.
The charter members of the local chapter are William A.
Schnader, Frederick Lyman Ballard, Everett H. Brown, Jr., and
L. Pearson Scott.
ADOPTION-EFFECT ON INHERITANCE.-The laws of Vermont'
provide that, on an adoption, the same rights, duties, and obligations
and the same rights of inheritance shall exist between the parties
as though the person adopted had been the legitimate child of the
adoptive parent, except that the person so adopted shall not be
capable of taking property expressly limited to the heirs of the
body of the adoptive parent. The question arose, in a recent case.whether such adoption establishes the relationship of parent and child
with all the consequences of that relationship, including the right of
inheritance from the adoptive parent by the issue of the adopted
child. And the court held that it did, interpreting the statute according to the meaning of the term adoption in the civil law.
The doctrine of adoption was unknown to the Common Law of
England, and in this country in states whose jurisprudence is based
exclusively on that system.' It has, however, been recognized by
the civil law from the earliest days of its existence, and on the
piovisions of that law, the statutes adjusted in the different states of
the Union have been founded. By the civil law before the time of
Justinian, the effect of adoption was to place the person adopted in
the same position he would have held had he been born a son of the

'Rev. Laws of Vermont i88o, Secs. 2536-2541.
'Batchelder v. Walworth, 82 Atl. 7 (Vt. 1912).

"Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243 (i88o), which gives a historical sketch of
the law; Morrison v. Sessions, 7o Mich. 297 (I888).
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adopter. It sometimes happened under this law, however, that a
son lost the succession to his own father by b.eing adopted, and to
his adoptive father by a subsequent emancipation. To remedy this,
Justinian provided, in his code, that the son given in adoption to a
stranger should be in the same position to his own father as before,
but gained by adoption the succession to his adoptive father if he
die intestate. 4 "Augustus did not adopt Tiberius who succeeded
him in the empire, till Tiberius had adopted his nephew Germanicus;
and the effect of this was that Tiberius became the son, and Germanicus the grandson, of Augustus at the same time."5
The leading American case, which applies the principles of the
civil law, is Vidal v. Commagere. 6 The court interpreted the word
'adoption" (in a case where a child was adopted by a special act
of the legislature) and declared "that, as by the common acceptation
of the word, the relationship of parent and child with all the consequences of that relationship is understood, * * * as such was
its acceptation among the civilians, we cannot say that the legislature used the word in a more restricted sense, in a sense not understood in common parlance, and not known in any system of laws."
The statutes 7 which exist in our various states have generally
been interpreted in the light of the civil law. The authorities unite
in affirming that, for all purposes of inheritance from the adoptive
parent, the adopted child becomes and is the lawful child of such
adoptive parent save in so far as the statute authorizing the adoption
may otherwise provide. His children inherit by representation the
estate of his deceased adoptive parent as if they were grandchildren.8
He has, under the intestate laws, all the rights of a child born in
lawful wedlockY He stands in the same position as a child born of
the date of his adoption in jurisdictions where the birth of a child,
subsequent to the making of a will, operates as a revocation of that
will. 10

With respect to inheritance by the adoptive father from or
through the adopted child, there is some confusion of opinion. The
weightier view, and in line with the civil law as herein expressed,
is, that on the death of such child his estate goes to his blood relatives. "The statute, in so far as it changes the general course of
descents and the distribution of intestate property, and ignores all
'Sandais Jushmdin, 113, 15. 119.
'Lord Mackenzie on the Roman Law, p. 131.
613 La. Ann., 516 (1858); to same effect is Gray v. Holmes, 57 Kan.
(1896).
"Pennsylvania Acts in point are: Act of May 4, 1855; Act of April 2,
1872; Act of May i9, 1887.
"Power v. Hafley, 85 Ky. 671 (1887) ; Gray v. Holmes, infra.
'Rowan's Estate, 132 Pa. 299 (i89o); Buckley v. Frasier, 153 Mass. 525

217

(i89i).
"Hilpire v. Claude, io9 Ia. 159 (x899); Flannigan v. Howard,

366 (19o2).

200
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merit on account of blood, should be strictly construed. * * *
Moreover, it is a statute prlimarily for the benefit of the adopted
child."'
M. G.

CORPORATIONS-REvOCABILITY OF VOTING TRUSTS.-A recent
decision in Pennsylvania, Comm. ex rel. Clark v. Roydhouse 1
appears to settle the law in that state in regard to the so-called
voting trusts,-agreements among a majority of the stockholders
to transfer their stock to a common trustee. In this case the agreement, whose object was "to protect and promote the individual ihterests of stockholders parties to the agreement," required the
trustee to pay the dividends received directly to the holders of trust
certificates and to vote the stock as directed by a committee appointed
by the majority of them. The agreement was to remain in force
for five years. At the instance of a party to it the agreement was
declared invalid on the ground that under these facts it was not
coupled with any beneficial interest in the trustee and hence re-2
vocable. The decision is in sharp contrast with Boyer v. Weslitt,
where an agreement of this sort was upheld on the ground that it
contained all the elements of an active trust and that there was a
beneficial interest in the trustee. In Pennsylvania, then, the rule
seems to be that there is nothing contrary to public policy in the
existence of voting trusts per se, but that under the general principles of the law of trusts, where such an agreement amounts to
a dry trust, it will not be sustained.. In the case last cited the
beneficial interest consisted in rights of management in the -trustees
and a complete control of the business policy of the corporation,
including the power to purchase the interest of any contracting
party at a valuation.
The law of voting trusts is of extremely modern origin. Up
to i891, itis said, no case was reported from the court of last resort
of any state.4 However, with the increasing complications arising
from the extension of corporate bodies in number of stockholders
and complexity of management, the desire for stability of control
and a consistent business policy became more necessary and consequently the number of voting trusts and the litigation attendant

'Upson v. Noble, 35 Ohio St. 655 (z88o); Hale v. Robbins, 53 Wis. 514
(88i), contra: Humphries v.Davis, ioo Ind. 369 (1884); in some -states
this contingency is provided for by statute; see Swick v. Coleman, 218 Ill.
33 (i9o5).
182 Atl.74 Pa. (i9ii).

'227 -Pa.398 (igio).
'The same idea isshown in Vanderbilt v. Bennett, 6 C. C. (Pa.) 93
(1889), where the court declared such a dry trust void as against public policy
and a statute, adding that even had it been good, it would have been revocable
at will.
'Professoi Simeon E. Baldwin, i Yale Law Journal, 1, 14 (i8gi).
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thereon has greatly increased. The courts are at utter variance
on the subject and there are almost as many.theories advanced as
there are cases reported.' It is submitted, however, that the view
taken in the Pennsylvania cases cited represents, as nearly as any
one theory can be said to do so, the trend of the law.'
In every case involving a voting trust that has been upheld
the court must first decide that such an agreement is not forbidden
by public policy. Public policy is a vague principle at best and it
is not surprising to find it moulded by the courts into an unlimited
number of reasons and objections. It seems, in accordance with
the majority of the cases, that voting trusts when made bona fide
are not contrary to public policy. There is no moral wrong in the
making of such an agreement, but only in its violation. Ther6 seems
to be no distinction between the case where the majority of stock
is owned by one man or by many acting as one. It is well said
in a Massachusetts 7 case that "the combination of common interests
is necessary and constantly taking place. It is as legitimate for a
majority of stockholders to combine as for other people." It
has always been objected that the power to vote cannot be disassociated from the ownership of stock. Many statutes disregard this
right, as where it is provided that the person entitled to vote at
corporate meetings must be a registered owner of stock at a fixed
time before meeting. If he transfers in the interim he may still
vote." It has been said that the minority stockholder is excluded
from combining with the majority and that his right to have the
corporation run by the majority is violated in that it is actually
run by a majority of the majority, which may be a minority of the
whole. It is answered that the only right of the minority stockholder is to insist that the control of the majority shall not be used
for fraud and oppression, and as long as that right remains unviolated it is no concern of his how the powe.r of the majority is distributed among themselves.9 There is no space here to go further
into the arguments for and against the public policy beneath voting
trusts. We can only intimate the policy of the courts in upholding
it and viewing the right of control as a separate property right
capable of alienation.
The principle laid down in Pennsylvania has been recognized
in a number of decisions. 1" A few cases" have held that an irre'In Warren v. Prim, 66 N. J. Eq. 353 (19o4), there were five opinions.
all differing in their theory, were given.
'Mr. Jesse W. Lilienthal, in io Harv. Law Rev. 428; Mr. Edward
Avery Harriman, 13 Yale Law Journal, io9.

'Holmes, C. J., in Brightman v. Bates, 175 Mass. IO5, i1 (i8g9).
'People v. Robinson, 64 Cal. 373 (1884).
Yale Law Journal, 113.
"Note to Morel v. Hoye, 16 L. R. A. (N.'S.) 1136 (i9o8).
913

"Griffith v. Jewett, 9 Ohio, Dec. Reprint, 627 (I899); Schwartz v. Ohio
Ry., 6 Ohio C. C. 415 (1892).
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vocable power to vote the stock cannot be given and that the agreement is good though revocable. Though the language used is broad
enough to cover cases of an active trust, yet the facts of these cases
show only a duty to vote as directed and passively hold the stock.2
Thus the rule is the same as that laid down by Boyer v. Nesbitt.
A few cases admit the right of a transferee of the certificates to
have the agreement invalidated. 13 In these cases also the trustees
had no active duties. As to what constitutes an active trust
opinions vary.' We have seen the Pennsylvania theory. In the
association the mere duty of voting has been held to make the trust
an active one irrespective of any duties of management."4 It would
seem in such cases that ordinary principles of contract law should
govern, and we are in sympathy with a decision holding that a
pledge of personal credit and financial responsibility to raise funds
to support the enterprise is valid consideration. It has been held
that where the only consideration is the mutual promise of the
stockholders any member may revoke at will. It is difficult to
reconcile this with general contract law, yet to hold otherwise would
make every voting trust valid, as there is in every case at least this
much consideration. It seems, moreover, that although this is not
the express ground of our principal case, it is at least a result of it.
Only two points in regard to the law of voting trusts may be
said to be generally admitted. Where the object of the trust is
illegal per se, as for example to procure some undue advantage
for the majority over the minority, it will be set aside.' 6 Where
the voting trust results from an agreement between stockholders
and creditors preserving the lien of the latter, and serving to -keep
the corporation off the rocks of bankruptcy, it will generally be
upheld.1r It would seem that such contracts are within a very
essential policy and in all respects made upon a valid consideration.
C. H. S., Jr.
INJUNCTION-RIGHT

To RESTRAIN

THE SALE OF LETTERS.-

Several phases of the question of property in letters were dealt with
in a recent case.' The executor of Mrs. Eddy, of Christian Science
Boyer v. Nesbitt (supra, note 2).
"White v. Thomas -Tire Co., 52 N. J. Eq. 178 (1894) ; Clowes v. Willes,
6o N. J. Eq. 179 (igoo).
"Note 7, supra.
"Smith v. San Francisco Ry.. 115 Cal.. at p. 6o3 (1897).
"Kreissl v. Distilling Co., 6i N. J. Eq. 5 (igor); Shepany Voting Trust
Cases, 6o Conn. 553 (1893); Hafer v. N. Y. Co., 9 Ohio, Dec. Reprints, 47o
(1899); Com. v. Russell, 48 N. J. Eq. 2o8 (i8gi); Fennesy v. Ross, 5 App.
Div. N. Y. 342 (896).
" Shelmerdine v. Welch, 8 C. C. (Pa.) 330 (1890) ; Mobile Ry. v. Nicolas,
98 Ala. 92 (1893).
'Baker V. Libbie, 97 N. F. io9 (Mass. 1912).
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fame, brought a bill to restrain an auctioneer of manuscripts from
publishing and selling certain autograph letters of his testatrix.
They possessed no literary merit, but were rerely friendly letters
written to a cousin about the commonplaces of life. The two
requests in the bill thus raised the question of the existence and the
extent of the proprietary right of the writer of private letters, having
no literary value.
There is no doubt that this right does exist. While in the earliest cases the letters did possess literary value,2 yet the right now
covers all letters, whether of literary value or not.$ The literary
value may increase their market value, but does not create the property right in the writer. Certain it is that this right gives to the
writer not only the right of publication, but also the negative right
of restraining their publication by the correspondent or any third
party. And the authorities are agreed in granting injunctions to
restrain such unlawful publication,' in the absence of any special
circumstances showing a different relation between the parties than
that presented in the normal case. 5 This conclusion, as pointed out
by the court, is supported not only by the authorities but by reason
as well. For every man is entitled to the fruits of his labor, whether
physical or mental, and the substance of the letters is the result of
some mental effort, no matter how small. The defendant was,
therefore, restrained from publishing the letters.
The court went further, and said that, connected with this
intangible right, is the 'right to copy or secure copies of the letters
within a reasonable time, saying: "Otherwise the author's right.
of publication may be lost." Though there seems to be no authority
for this proposition (nor is there any against it), this is probably
not going too far, as it does not appear that this detracts from
whatever right of property the recipient may have in the paper on
which the letter is written.
There still remains, however, the question as to whether the
author's rights, positive and negative, are limited to publication, or
whether they permit him also to prevent a transfer of the letters
by the recipient. The question is a difficult one, because of8 the small
number of cases on the point. The case of Pope v. Curl, suggests
that "it is only a special property in the receiver, possibly the prop2

Pope v. Curl,

2

Atk. 341 (1741)).

Here the letters were written by

Alexander Pope. In Thompson v. Stanhope, 12 Ambler, 737 (i774), the
letters involved were Lord Chesterfield's famous letters to his son.
'Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanston, 4o2 (1818); Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story,
ioo (U. S. C. C. 1842).
'There is a valuable collection of authorities in the opinion of our
principal case.
'As an instance of these the court cites the case of letters by an agent
to or for his principal and others, where the conditions indicate that this
property in the form or expression is in another than the writer.

Supra.
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would seem to allow
erty of the paper may belong to him." This
alienability. The case of Oliver v. Oliver 7 decided that the recipient
of a letter has sufficient property in the paper upon which it is
written to entitle him to maintain detinue for it against the sender
into whose hands it has come. But it would be very difficult to
imply a right to sell from this decision. The case of Grigsby v.
Breckenridge 8 decided that the property of the recipient in the letter
implies the right to keep it or destroy it, or to dispose of it in any
give him the
other way than by publication. This would certainly
9
right to sell. But the case of Rice v. Williams' holds that the
receiver of private letters has not such an interest therein that they
can be made the subject of a sale without the owner's consent.'* 5o
it would seem there is authority for a ruling either way on this
question.
The court decided that in the absence of some special limitations
imposed either by the subject-matter of the letter," or the circumnstances under which it is sent,' 2 the right of the recipient is one of
unqualified title in the material on which it is written. From this
it follows that be can sell it to another. His ownership in the letter
is absolute, subject to the author's paramount rights of publication.
The court, therefore, refused the injunction as to a sale of the letters,
none of the special circumstances referred to.
thereItbeing
wouldpresent
seem that
the conclusion reached in the principal case
is correct in principle. Upon the sending of the letter the writer
retains property in the ideas expressed therein, but passes on to
the recipient property in the paper. The inability of the recipient
to publish the letter does not put any limit on his property in the
paper, nor does a sale of the letter infringe the right of property
in the author in his ideas; for that property in the ideas, it is believed,
was never intended to do more than protect the author from unauthorized publication. It cannot mean that the author and the recipient alone are entitled to a knowledge of the ideas expressed in the
letter. A common law copyright is infringed only by publication;
yet even in the absence of publication the ideas might be transferred
from one to another. If this be the extent of the author's property
in his ideas, a mere sale of the letters would not constitute an
P.V.R.M.
infringement of it.
C. B. N. S. 139 (1861).
'2; Bush, 480 (Ky. 1867).
'ii

Fed. 437 (1887).
Here there was a contract for the sale of sixty thousand letters written to the vendors of a voltaic belt to a physician. The case was also
decided on the ground that the contract was void as against good morals.
It was, therefore, really not necessary to decide that a recipient cannot sell
a letter without the owner's consent.
"Letters of extreme affection and other fiduciary communications are
cited by the court as ekamples of this.
"Such as a confidential relation existing between the parties, out of
which would arise an implied prohibition against any use of the letters.
'32
'

NOTES
LEGAL ETHIcs.-The New York County Lawyers' Association
Committee on Professional Ethics has recently embarked upon a
new and interesting line of work. It has announced to the members
of the bar of New York County that it stands ready "to advise
inquirers respecting questions of proper professional conduct." The
answers to questions submitted for its consideration are published for circulation among the bench and bar of New York City.
The committee, through the courtesy of its chairman, Charles A.
Boston, Esq., has extended to the LAW REVIEW the privilege of
publishing, from time to time, the inquiries submitted and answers
thereto,--a privilege of which the LAW REVIEW is glad to take
advantage.
Following are three questions recently propounded to the.committee:
"I. Is an attorney entitled to retain moneys in payment of disbursements
when said moneys were received by him in another matter in which he
appeared as attorney for the same client, and assuming that the client has
not agreed to allow the attorney to retain same?
2. Is an attorney entitled to retain moneys expended for disbursements,
which moneys were received in the same matter in which the disbursements
were had?
3. Where the original matter in which the expenses are made is one
involving a collection, and something is received by the attorney, is he
entitled to retain what he has received on account of disbursements had
therein ?"

To these questions the committee replied:
"Resolved, That in the opinion of the committee in each case suggested,
the attorney is entitled to retain the amount of money so expended for disbursements, but subject, in case of objection by the 'client, to a judicial
determination of the reasonableness and propriety of the disbursements and
the right of the attorney to so apply the moneys; but that the attorney
should not make such an application of the withheld funds for his own
purposes as to preclude or endanger their return in whole or in part if
the question be determined against him by a competent court."

PROPERTY-POLLUTION OF WATERS AND WATER COURSES BY
MINE OWNERS.-In Arminius Chemical Co. v. Landrum,' the

Supreme Court of Virginia added its voice to the chorus of dis-

approbation which has greeted the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Sanderson 2 whenever courts other than those of Pennsylvania
have been asked to'apply the principles of that decision to cases
before them. In the Virginia case the defendant companies were
engaged in producing iron pyrites, the separation of which from
the refuse at the mine required that the ore be washed with large
'73 S. E. Rep. 459 (1912).
2 113 Pa. 126 (1886).
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quantities of water. The water used in the washing became impregnated with sulphuric acid and solid matter. The water Was
permitted to flow into a stream, which in turn flowed through the
plaintiff's farm land. The noxious substances in the water rendered it unfit for farm purposes and destroyed the fertility of some
.thirty acres of land. An action of trespass on the case being
brought, the appellate court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff
on the ground that lower riparian owners are possessed of the right
to have the stream flow to them substantially preserved in its original
quantity and purity, and that no exception to this right exists in
favor of upper mine owners whose mines are so situated that a
pollution of the stream is a necessary incident to their operation.
The case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson 3 has been the
subject of so much controversy and criticism that it is unnecessary to repeat the facts or the decision in detail. After holding
on three appeals that a right of action lay, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, on the fourth appeal, held that a lower riparian
owner had no recourse against the owner of a mine further up the
stream who pumped aciduated water from his mine and permitted
it to flow into the stream so that it became unfit for domestic
or other use. The mining of coal was held a natural use of the
land, and the injury necessarily caused to a lower owner was
dainnum absque injuria. The ordinary rights of riparian owners
had ex necessitate to give way to the interests of the. community
in order to permit the development of the natural resources of the
country and to make possible the prosecution of the lawful business of mining coal.
This case has not been followed in any other jurisdiction even
in those where the mining interests rival those of Pennsylvania,
e. g. Ohio 4 and West Virginia. 5 Even in Pennsylvania the case
has been restricted to its exact fadts, and wherever the case has
been cited elsewhere the courts have repudiated it in no uncertain
terms. The other courts are unanimous in saying that the necessities of the mining business furnish the sole excuse for the Sanderson
decision, and they decline to adopt any rule "whereby the necessities of one man's business can be made the standard by which to
measure another man's rights in a thing which belongs to both." 7
The reasons adverse to the Sanderson case as outlined in various
cases are as follows: There exists at common law a right inherent
in the ownership of property along a natural stream to have the
water transmitted without sensible alteration in quality or unrea'Supra.
' Columbus, Etc., Co. v. Tucker, 48 Ohio, 41 (1891).
I Day v. Louisville Coal and Coke Co., 6o W. Va. 27 (1907).
'Williams v. Union Imp. Co., I Pa. Dist. Rep. 288 (1892).

'Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., x64 N. Y. 303 (igoo); Coal Co. v. Ruffner,
Ioo S. W. Rep. 116 (Tenn., 19o7).
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sonable diminution in quantity." Any act 6f others which tends
to infringe this right is a trespass for which an action for damages
Will lie, and an injunction may issue if the acts are repeated. When
the infringements are occasioned by -actions of an upper riparian
owner the maxim "Sic-utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" is applied.'
These rules are not to be relaxed even in favor of business interests
engaged in developing the resources of the country.' 0 This reasoning is especially applicable in America, in view of the constitutional
provisions prohibiting the taking of private property for public uses
without making just compensation. A fortiori if private property
may not be taken for purely public uses it cannot be taken for private
purposes.2"
The reasoning of the court in the Sanderson case was that the
rights of the lower riparian owner was to have the water come to
him only as affected by the natural user of his property by the upper
owner. This idea of "natural" user was borrowed from the opinion of
Lord Cairns in Bylands v. Fletcher,12 but it is submitted that an
application of the true principles of Bylands v. Fletcher would
have induced a different decision. Admitting that the mining of
coal is a "natural" use of the land,' 3 which is denied in some cases 14
none the less, the collection of large quantities of aciduated water,
and the pumping of it from the bottom of the mine into a stream,
are "non-natural" uses with the meaning of the words as used by
Lord Cairns.
Lord Shand criticises the Sanderson case most ably in Young v.
Banking Distillery Co.,' where he says: "While the enormous value
of the mining interests in the district of Pennsylvania from which
the case came might have formed a good reason for appealing to
the legislature to pass a special measure to restrain any proceedings by interdict at the instance of surface proprietors and to confine them to a right to damages only for injury sustained; that value
could in my opinion afford no good legal ground for allowing the
proprietor of a mine to work his minerals for his own profit so as to
destroy or greatly injure his neighbor's estate by subjecting it, by
means of artificial operations, to the burden of receiving water
'Fletcher v. Smith, L, R. 2 App. Cas. 781, Eng. (1877).
'Lawson v. Price, 45 Md. 123 (1876); Tenn. Coal Co. v. Hamilton, ioo
252 (1893).
" Robinson v. Black Diamond Mining Co., 5o Cal. 461 (1875); Yuba
County v. Cloke, 79 Cal. 239 (I899); Pennington v. Brinsop Hall Coal Co.,
L. R. 5,Ch. Div. 569 (877).
"Townsend v. Norfolk Ry. Co., 105 Va. 22 (i9O6); Beach v. Sterling
Iron Co., 54 N. J.Eq. 65 (x895) ; Shoffner v. Sutherland, iii Va. 298 (i9io).
" 3 H. L. 330 (865).

Ala.

"Iron Co. v. Kenyon, L. R. ii, Ch. Div. 783 (1876).
" Columbus, Etc., Co., v. Tucker, 48 Ohio, 41 (Y89x); Beach v. Sterling
If-on Co., 54 N. J.Eq. (i895).
"i

App. Case, 641 (1893).
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enlarged in quantity and destroyed in quality without compensation
or damages for the injury done."
The decision is also open to criticism from an economic viewpoint. No enterprise or business is profitable to the community as
a whole which is unable to pay its own way. If therefore a coal
mine cannot produce more wealth than it destroys it should not be
operated. If it does produce a surplus of wealth there is no reason
for removing the burden of the value destroyed from the persons
who receive direct benefits in the shape of profits and plading them
upon an individual to whom any benefit accruing comes merely
because he is a member of society. In fact, the Virginia case holds
that the benefits resulting to the plaintiff from an increase in the
value of the rest of his land due to the increase in population
in assessing
attracted by the mines may not be taken into account
the damages, and in this it follows other cases. 16
L.P.S.
TRusTs--ASSIGNMENT OF CHOSES IN AcrioN.-Where several
assignees of portions of a legatee's interest under a will are competing for payment, that one will have priority whose assignment
Was first brought to the knowledge of the trustee, though the assignment was actually made later than that to another claimant, if he
took in good faith and without knowledge of the earlier assignment.'
The question involved is whether the assignee who was first
in point of time, but not in giving notice to the trustee, is by that
fact, and that alone, .to be made subsequent in payment to the
assignee whose claim was first brought to the trustee's attention.
The ground on which the decision in the present case is based is
that the first assignee in point of time has been negligent in not
notifying the trustee, and has thus made it easy for the assignor
to commit fraud on an innocent third person by a subsequent assignment to him of the same -interest. Consequently, the assignbr, and
not the later assignee, who has no knowledge of the prior transaction, must stand the loss.
There are two general views on this subject; one-that of the
present case, which obtains in England, Pennsylvania, and some
other states; and the other-that priority in time of assignment
controls, and notice to the trustee is not necessary to protect the
assignee's rights. The leading case adopting the first theory is that
of Dearle v. Hall,4 decided in England in 1828. Brown was entitled
to an annuity, which he assigned by way of collateral security to

"Francis v. Schoelkopf, 53 N. Y. 152 (873); Marcy v. Fries, i8 Kan.
353 1(1877).
Jenkinson v. New York Finance Co., 82 At. Rep. 36 (N. J. 1911).
23 Russ. I.
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Dearie; but neither of them notified the trustee. Later Brown sold
the same annuity to Hall, whose inquiries did not bring to light the
existence of the prior encumbrance, for the.trustee was ignorant
of it. Thus Hall knew nothing of Dearle's claim; and the court
decided that, under these circumstances, Hall was entitled to the
fund, as he had been the first to notify the trustee. The basis of
the decision is stated by the court as follows: "Where personal
property is assigned, delivery is necessary to complete the transaction, not as between the vendor and the vendee, but as to third
persons, in order that they may not be deceived by apparent possessions and ownerships remaining in a person who, in fact, is
not the owner. This doctrine is not confined to chattels in possession, but extends to choses in action, bonds, etc." The statement is elaborated by the following: "In cases like the present,
the act of giving the trustee notice is, in a certain degree, taking
possession of the fund; it is going as far towards equitable possession as it is possible to go; for, after notice given, the trustee
of the fund becomes a trustee for the assignee who has given him
notice." It has been suggested that it was not the possibility of
fraud on innocent third persons which was thus made the foundation of the decisions, but rather a completion of possession and
title, or a change in the trustee's relation, making him thenceforth
hold for the assignee. Whether this uncertainty was warranted or
not, the doubt was set at rest by the House of Lords in Ward v.
Duncombe,3 where it was stated that the underlying reason of the
decision in the earlier case was the possibility of fraud, through
the negligence of the first assignor in not notifying the trustee. Such
has been the view ever since.
The same doctrine was definitely established in Pennsylvania
in the case of Phillips's Estate (No. 3), where it was said that

"business transactions constantly require the assignments of choses
in action;" and such would be greatly hampered if this method of

protecting the assignees were not adopted,--an analogy being drawn
to the case of sales of personal property, in which the vendee is
required to take possession for the protection of subsequent purchasers. A similar position has been taken by the Federal courts,
including the Supreme Court,5 and by several states, amongst which
are California,6 Pennsylvania,7 New Jersey,5 Vermont 9 and Connecticut.' 0 On the other hand there are a number of states where
' (1893) App. Cases, 369.
4205 Pa. 515 (i9o3).
"Methven et al. v. Staten Island Light, Heat and Power Co., 66 Fed. 113
(i895); Spain v. Hamilton's Administrator, i Wall. 6o4 (1863).
'Graham Paper Co. v. Pembroke, i24 Cal. 117 (1899).
'Phillips's Estate, supra.
SJenkinson v. New York Finance Co., supra.
'Ward & Co. v.Morrison and Trustee, 25 Vt. 593 (1853).
"Vanbuskirk v.Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 141 (1841).
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it is held that priority in the time of assignment gives priority in
right, and the first assignee need not notify the trustee in order to
protect himself. Among these may be mentioned New York,"'
Massachusetts 12 and Illinois. 1" The general view of these courts
is that the subsequent assignee gets only what the assignor had
to assign.
The doctrine of the case under discussion seems to be supported by the better reasoning. There is no effective way of preventing fraud under the other theory, and it can hardly be said
to be an onerous duty to impose on the first assignee to require him
to notify the trustee. This is certainly much better than to attempt
to correct the evil by extending the recording system to include
such cases. In the great majority of instances, it would be the
natural thing for any assignee to inquire of the trustee as to the
assignor's interest, and subsequently notify the trustee of the change
in ownership. If notice is given the trustee, then a later assignee
must take the risk, if he chooses not to investigate the assignor's
title. A rule that rewards the careful and diligent, and at the
same time largely eliminates opportunity to defraud, certainly has
a presumption in its favor, and should receive careful consideration
L.C.A.
before being discarded.
TRUSTS-RESULTING

TRUSTS-CONSTRUCTIVE

TRUsTs.-In

a

controversy over the title of certain real estate, a husband, who made
a voluntary conveyance to his wife through an intermediary, sought
a decree for reconveyance, insisting that a trust arose in his favor
by operation of law either as (i) a resulting trust, there being no
consideration for the deed, or as (2) a constructive trust through
failure to perform an oral promise to reconvey. The court denied
the decree, holding (i) a resulting trust cannot arise in favor of a
grantor in the absence of fraud, under a-deed of conveyance expressing a money consideration with declaration to use of the grantee,
and (2) that the evidence failed to establish the promise to reconvey, and even had it been established, the mere failure to perform
it if originally made in good faith, is not fraud.1
In the first proposition the court was undoubtedly correct under
the modern rule. Probably the best short statement of the old rule
and the reasons for it and for the adoption of the modern rule is
to be found in Perry--"Trusts and Trustees." "It was formerly
said that if a man conveyed his estate to a stranger without consideration, or for a mere nominal one, a trust resulted to the owner on
"Flortunato v. Patten, 147 N. Y. 277 (895); approved in Niles v.
Mathusa, 162 N. Y. 546 (i9oo).
'Putnam v. Story, 132 Mass. 2o5 (1882).
"Hawk v. Ament, 28 I1. App. 39o (i888).
'Dawn v. Dawn, 82 At!. Rep. 322 (N. J. 1912).
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the ground that the law would not presume a man to part with his
property without some inducement thereto. This was in strict
analogy to the common law, whereby if a feoffment was made
without consideration the legal title only passed to the feoffee and
a use resulted to the feoffor. . . . And the burden was put on
the grantee to show the consideration, and upon failure of proof a
use was presumed to the grantor, for the reason, as stated by Sir
Francis Bacon, that when feoffments were made, it grew doubtful
whether estates were in use or purchase, and as purchases were
things notorious and uses were things secret, the Chancellor thought
it more convenient to put the purchaser to prove his consideration
than the feoffer to prove his trust, and so made intendment toward
the use and put the purchaser to proof of his purchase." 2 But "this
rule does not apply to modern conveyances and no trust is now held
to result to the grantor, although he conveys the estate without
consideration.' At the present day almost all conveyances are in
form of deeds of bargain and sale and operate to pass the estate
by virtue of the statute of uses, or of statutes in the several states
prescribing the formalities necessary to convey lands. . . . In
conveyances that are in form deeds of bargain and sale parol evidence cannot be received to control or contradict the statement of
the consideration. . . . And where the deed contains the clause,
as most deeds do, that the estate is had and held to the grantee his
heirs and assigns, to his and their use anckbehoof, no trust can
result, as it is a rule that when a use is declared no other use can
be shown to result." 8 And certainly "voluntary conveyances to a
wife or child were never within the rule that such gifts raised a
resulting trust for the donor," for "if a feoffment was made to a
wife or child no use resulted, for the consideration of blood was
held good consideration and an advance or settlement was presumed." 4
But the second proposition advanced by the court by way of
dicta does not seem so well established under the facts of the principal case. It is undoubted that whenever a person acquires legal
title to land by means of an intentionally false verbal promise to
hold for a certain purpose as to reconvey to the grantor or convey
to another, and he refuses to perform, a trust ex maleficio arises
and equity will compel him to fulfill the trust by conveying according to his engagement. 5 There has been some diversity of opinion
among the courts as to just what constitutes fraud in such a case.
Some maintain that it must be fraud existing at the time the deed
'Perry Trusts and Trustees, 6th Ed., Vol. i,Sec. i61.
'Idem, Sec. 162.
'Idem, Sec. 164.
'Hunt v.Roberts, 40 Me. 187 (1855); Hodges v.Howard, 5 R. I. 149
(1858); Hoge v. Hoge, i Watts, 163 (1832); Cameron v. Ward, 8 Ga. 245
(i8So); Arnold v. Cord, 16 Ind. i77 (i86i): Laing v. McKee, i3 Mich. x24
(1865); Nelson v. Worrall, 2o Iowa, 469 (1866).
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is made," and something more than a mere verbal promise afterward broken, otherwise the Statute of Frauds would be virtually
abrogated. 7 This strict rule has been laid down as to conveyances
by will as well as inter vivos, but the majority of the recent decisions do not insist on an actual fraudulent intention on the part
of the legatee or devisee as necessary to the creation of a trust of
this nature. In one case it was said "the fraud is in the refusal to
pay the legacy; not in the promise, but in the breach," 8 and this
view has been followed in many of the more recent English and
American cases.9
There would seem to be a sound reason for this relaxation of
the strict rule in cases of conveyance by will, for an adherence' to
it would tend in a great many instances to an evasion of the Mortmain Acts. To conclusively presume fraud from failure to perform a promise in reliance on which a conveyance inter vivos
is made is reasonable, but it is not reasonable to presume fraud
in a promisor who fails to perform when the law prohibits performance on his part. So in the case of a gift or secret trust for
a charitable purpose, falling within the terms of the Mortmain Act
in the jurisdiction, the courts have either to do away with the requirement of incipient fraud or allow the donee to take absolutely,
in which case he could immediately convey to the charity. The
first alternative is adopted and the acts preserved in their effectiveness. Of course no such reason exists for changing the general
rule in cases inter vivos, but there seems to be a recognized exception to it in some jurisdictions, where it has been held that if the
parties stand in a relation of confidence with each other, the fact
that at the time of the conveyance and promise to reconvey there was
no fraudulent intent on the part of the grantee is immaterial, and
a constructive trust arises on failure to perform. 10 It is submitted
that had the promise on the part of the wife been proved in the
principal case, the case would fall within this exception and failure
to perform would constitute sufficient fraud on which to raise a
constructive trust in favor of the husband.
E. H. B., Jr.
'Grove v. Kase, 195 Pa. 325 (igoo).
'Wheeler v. Reynolds, 66 N. Y. 227 (x876) ; Bennett v. Dollar Savings
Bank, 87 Pa. 382 (1878); Gibson v. Dennis, 82 IIl. 304 (1876).
'Dissenting opinion, Staples, J., Sprinkle v. Hayworth, 26 Gratt, 384
(r875).
'In re Fleetwood L R. 15 Ch. D. 594 (i88o); in re Stead, i Ch. 237
(x9oo); Curdy v. Berton, 79 Cal. 420 (1889); in re Kelerman, 126 N. Y. 73
(i8i); in re Maddock, 2 Ch. 22o (19o2); Tennant v. Tennant, 43 W. Va.
547 (1897); Trustees of Amherst College v. Ritch, I5I N. Y. 282 (x897);
O'Hara v. Dudley, 95 N. Y. 4o3 .(i884).
"Ward v. Rabe, 96 N. Y. 44 (1884); Brisan v. Brisan, 75 Cal. 525
(i888); Gruhen v. Richardson, x1.8 Ill. 78 (1889).

